

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USNATO 03732 121758Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
DODE-00 (ISO) W

-----125857 012211Z /47

O 121742Z APR 78

FM USMISSION USNATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0684

USICA WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 03732

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, UR, US, PARM, MNUC

SUBJECT: ERW: LOOKING AHEAD

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 7170 (NOTAL), (B) MOSCOW 7399 (NOTAL)

-

1. THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT MARKS NOT THE END, BUT RATHER THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE OF PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE ER WEAPON. FOR THE ALLIES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO MOVE BEYOND RECENT SPECULATION, WHICH IS GOOD PRESS COPY BUT BAD FOR ALLIANCE COHESION, AND TO SHIFT THE FOCUS TO WHAT LIES AHEAD.

-

2. AS REFTELS MAKE CLEAR, MOSCOW INTENDS TO INTENSIFY ITS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ER WEAPON. THROUGH "BAN THE BOMB" CAMPAIGNS AND INITIATIVES AT THE SSOD, THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO SWAY THE PUBLIC DEBATE, SPLIT THE ALLIES, AND DEFLECT ANY PRESSURE FOR THE SOVIETS TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USNATO 03732 121758Z

EVIDENCE RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT, BEYOND "MUTUAL RENUNCIATION".

-

3. WE SEE A NEED FOR SWIFT AND IMAGINATIVE EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE US AND THE ALLIES ACT IN UNISON IN THIS AREA AND THAT THEY NOT BE DEFENSIVE IN DEALING WITH SOVIET PRESSURES. IN THE

ARMS CONTROL FIELD, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIETS NOT CONCLUDE THAT THEY CAN ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES THROUGH PROPAGANDA BARRAGES AND THAT SOVIET ARMS RESTRAINT IS NOT REQUIRED. THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL 7 STATEMENT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD.

-

4. AS A FIRST STEP, WE RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE TO ALL POSTS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND MAJOR NON-ALIGNED CAPITALS, INSTRUCTING THEM TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS EMPHASIZING THAT THE BALL IS IN THE SOVIET COURT, THAT A PROPAGANDA RESPONSE TO US RESTRAINT IS NOT SUFFICIENT, AND THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE ULTIMATE DECISION "WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT IN ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE". WE RECOMMEND THAT US OFFICIALS STRESS IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS THE NEED FOR CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVIET RESTRAINT AND THAT THE ICA STRESS THIS POINT IN ITS MEDIA OUTPUT. WE ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE ALLIES HERE AND URGE THEM TO JOIN THE US IN STRESSING PUBLICLY THAT IT IS NOW UP TO THE SOVIETS TO SHOW RESTRAINT.

-

5. WE REQUEST AS WELL WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON HOW THIS ISSUE IS LIKELY TO BE PLAYED AT THE SSOD, PARTICULARLY IF THERE IS A SOVIET RESOLUTION URGING MUTUAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USNATO 03732 121758Z

RENUNCIATION OF THE ERW. IT WILL BE DAMAGING IF THE ALLIES ARE SPLIT ON THIS ISSUE AT THE SSOD BY A SOVIET INSPIRED INITIATIVE USING LANGUAGE THE NORWEGIANS, DUTCH AND BELGIANS WOULD FIND DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE. WE RECOMMEND PREPARATION OF US/ALLIED RESOLUTIONS OR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COUNTER A LIKELY SOVIET INITIATIVE.

-

6. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE MANY OTHER ISSUES IN PLAY AT THE SSOD. BUT IN TERMS OF ALLIED AND US DOMESTIC INTERESTS, WE THINK IT VITAL THAT THE SOVIETS NOT BE PERMITTED TO BULLDOZE THROUGH A PROPOSAL THAT CUTS THE GROUND FROM UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT. THE ALLIES HAVE NOT FOCUSSED ON THIS ISSUE AND WE URGE THAT THIS QUESTION BE ADDRESSED AT THE MAY 2 NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MEETING AND THE SUBSEQUENT NAC DISCUSSION. TO PREPARE THE WAY, WE REQUEST PROMPT GUIDANCE THAT WILL PERMIT US TO REVIEW THE QUESTION WITH THE ALLIES IN APRIL.

-

7. IN SUM, WE URGE THAT THE US NOT LEAVE A VACUUM IN WHICH THE SOVIETS APPEAR ABLE IN COMING MONTHS TO

BLOCK AN ALLIED DEFENSE OPTION BY PROPAGANDA AND
AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAIN THAT SOVIET ARMAMENTS ARE
NOT A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC CONCERN. BENNETT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION, NUCLEAR BOMBS, ADVANCED WEAPONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978USNATO03732
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780185-1177
Format: TEL
From: USNATO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780463/aaaacbbx.tel
Line Count: 119
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a0013ab1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 MOSCOW 7170, 78 MOSCOW 7399
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2986654
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ERW: LOOKING AHEAD
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UR, US, NATO
To: STATE ICA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a0013ab1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014